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ABSTRACT
The role of skill (fitness) and luck (randomness) as driv-
ing forces on the dynamics of resource accumulation in a
myriad of systems have long puzzled scientists. Fueled by
undisputed inequalities that emerge from actual competi-
tions, there is a pressing need for better understanding the
effects of skill and luck in resource accumulation. When
such competitions are driven by externalities such as cu-
mulative advantage (CA), the rich-get-richer effect, little is
known with respect to fundamental properties such as their
duration and intensity. In this work we provide a mathe-
matical understanding of how CA exacerbates the role of
luck in detriment of skill in simple and well-studied compe-
tition models. We show, for instance, that if two agents are
competing for resources that arrive sequentially at each time
unit, an early stroke of luck can place the less skilled in the
lead for an extremely long period of time, a phenomenon
we call “struggle of the fittest”. In the absence of CA, the
more skilled quickly prevails despite any early stroke of luck
that the less skilled may have. We prove that duration of a
simple skill and luck competition model exhibit power law
tails when CA is present, regardless of skill difference, which
is in sharp contrast to exponential tails when CA is absent.
Our findings have important implications to competitions
not only in complex social systems but also in contexts that
leverage such models.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
G.3 [Probability and Statistics]: Stochastic processes,
Distribution functions
General Terms
Theory
Keywords
Competition, Cumulative advantage, Po´lya’s urn, Duration,
Intensity
1. INTRODUCTION
Resource (wealth) accumulation in a variety of complex
systems lead to remarkable inequalities in resource distribu-
tion. The connectivity skewness of autonomous system [27],
webpage and hashtag popularity [5, 9, 26], and the num-
ber of friends and followers in online social networks [25,
26, 36] have profound implications on the performance of
information systems, such as caching [6] and searching [1].
In these complex systems, skill (fitness) and luck (random-
ness) are believed to be two fundamental ingredients that
drive resource accumulation dynamics in a variety of social
and complex systems. Apart from them, externalities are
also believed to play a fundamental role in how resources
accumulate. In this regard, cumulative advantage (CA),
where accumulated resources promote gathering even more
resources,1 is a simple and widely-applied framework that
captures the essence of network externalities, while random
walk (RW) serves as the hallmark framework without exter-
nalities.
These two parsimonious models have a long tradition in
providing key insights into the process of resource accumu-
lation, with CA, for instance, presented as a mechanism to
help explain the presence of power-laws observed in empir-
ical data [5, 10, 33, 34]. It is also well-known that in both
frameworks the most skilled is bound to accumulate more re-
sources. However, the assurance that the most skilled even-
tually prevails provides little practical insight. The question
is, how long will it take for the most skilled to prevail?
We approach this problem by considering classical, simple
and well-studied theoretical models for competitions based
on skill and luck that are either coupled with or free of cu-
mulative advantage. We focus on competitions between two
agents and study two fundamental aspects of competitions:
duration – the time required for the most skilled to overtake
its competitor and forever enjoy undisputed leadership; in-
tensity – the number of times competitors tie for the leader-
ship. In this direction, we make the following main contri-
butions.
• In the case where the two competitors have equal fit-
ness, we obtain the asymptotic tail distributions for
both duration and intensity of CA competitions. We
demonstrate that they are power laws with respective
tail exponents −1/2 and −1, which are independent of
the initial wealth of the competitors.
• In the case where the two competitors have unequal
fitness, we derive asymptotic lower and upper bounds
1This phenomenon appears in the literature under many
variants such as Price’s cumulative advantage model [10],
preferential attachment [4, 5, 7], “the rich get richer”,
Matthew effect [12, 29, 33], and path-dependent increasing
returns [3].
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for the tail distribution of duration of CA competi-
tions, and an upper bound for the tail distribution of
their intensity. These bounds show that duration is
heavy tailed while intensity is exponential tailed in the
presence of CA. In particular, duration is heavier tailed
while intensity is lighter tailed than corresponding RW
competitions.
• We observe that a slight difference in fitness results
in a extremely heavy tail for duration of CA compe-
titions. Thus, a slightly more skilled individual might
have to hang on to the competition for an extremely
long period of time before taking the ultimate lead, a
phenomenon we call the “struggle of the fittest”.
Despite 90 years since the basic CA model was first pro-
posed [13], known as Po´lya’s urn model, our work is, to the
best of our knowledge, the first to characterize the duration
and intensity distributions of CA competitions with skill.
We believe our results have profound implications to our un-
derstanding of competitions, beyond its importance to the
performance of systems that leverage resource distribution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
briefly discusses the related work. Section 3 introduces the
CA competition model. Section 4 presents the theoretical re-
sults, illustrated and supplemented by simulations. Section
5 provides the proofs for the theoretical results in Section 4.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. RELATEDWORK
Resource accumulation is an ubiquitous phenomenon that
naturally arises in a variety of social and complex systems.
The problem is usually framed as a competition among agents
for resources that are abundant, and has been studied in dif-
ferent contexts across various disciplines ranging from pro-
teins binding within a cell [14, 23] to views of online social
media [8, 16] and citations among scholarly papers [10, 38].
Models proposed for resource accumulation competitions
are generally driven by skill (fitness) and luck (randomness)
as well as externalities, such as network effects. The Po´lya’s
urn model [13, 28] is widely used to capture these effects.
Most previous work on Po´lya’s urn model and its general-
izations focuses on the share of resources gathered by each
agent, also known as the agent’s market share, proving con-
vergence and limiting results of the market share distribu-
tion [28, 21, 32, 30].
However, two fundamental metrics associated with com-
petitions, duration - how long it takes for the undisputed
winner to emerge, and intensity - how many times the com-
petitors tie for the leadership, have largely been neglected
in the literature. Previous results establish that the most
skilled agent eventually wins [28], and that average inten-
sity up to time t is approximately (log t)α, where α depends
on the relative skill of the competitors [18, 17]. To the best
of our knowledge, no previous work has provided rigorous
characterizations for the distributions of duration and in-
tensity of competitions in Po´lya’s urn models. Our work
partially fills this gap for the two competitor case and sheds
light on some recent approximate results [18, 17].
3. MODELS
In this section, we formally introduce competition models
for two competing agents and give precise definitions for two
Xt
Yt
Figure 1: State space of competition processes, with
an illustration of a sample path with x0 = 2, y0 = 1,
and‘ three ties at time t = 3, 5, 7.
fundamental metrics of a competition, i.e. its duration and
intensity.
3.1 General Setup and Metrics
Let X and Y denote the two agents that engage in the
competition. Each agent is associated with a positive fitness
value that reflects its intrinsic competitiveness or skill level.
Let fX and fY denote the fitness of X and Y , respectively,
and r = fX/fY the fitness ratio. Without loss of generality,
we assume that fX ≥ fY and hence r ≥ 1.
The resource that the agents compete for will be gener-
ically referred to as wealth, which is measured in discrete
units. The competition starts at time t = 0 with agents X
and Y having x0 and y0 units of initial wealth, respectively.
We consider a discrete-time process. At each time step, one
unit of wealth is added to the system and given to either X
or Y . Denote by Xt and Yt the respective cumulative wealth
of X and Y at time t. The complete history of the competi-
tion {(Xt, Yt)}∞t=0 then forms a discrete-time discrete-space
stochastic process. The state space S is the first quadrant
of the integral lattice (see Figure 1),
S = {(x, y) ∈ Z2 : x ≥ 1, y ≥ 1}.
The initial condition is (X0, Y0) = (x0, y0). How the process
evolves over time is defined by specific competition mod-
els, of which the CA competition model to be introduced in
Section 3.2 is an example.
We now make the notions of duration and intensity of
competitions more precise by defining them through events
of wealth ties. Given a competition process {(Xt, Yt)}∞t=0,
we say that a tie occurs at time t if Xt = Yt. Figure 1 shows
three ties at time t = 3, 5, 7.
The duration T of a competition is defined to be the time
of the last tie, i.e.,
T = sup{t ≥ 0 : Xt = Yt}.
When there is no tie, we follow the standard convention that
T = sup ∅ = −∞. The competition ends at time T in the
sense that one of the agents takes the lead and never lose it
again after T .
The intensity Nt of a competition until time t is the num-
ber of ties that occur by time t, i.e.,
Nt =
t∑
i=0
1{Xi = Yi},
where 1{A} is the indicator of event A. The intensity N of a
competition is the total number of ties throughout the com-
petition, i.e., N = limt→∞Nt. This measures the intensity
of the competition in the sense that it counts the number of
potential changes in leadership. Note that T < +∞ if and
only if N < +∞.
3.2 CA Competition Model
In the CA competition model, the unit of wealth intro-
duced at time t+ 1 is given to X with probability
pX,t =
fXXt
fXXt + fY Yt
=
rXt
rXt + Yt
;
otherwise it is given to Y . Note that the transition probabil-
ity pX,t embodies both fitness and CA effects (externalities).
More formally, in the CA competition model, the com-
plete history {(Xt, Yt)}∞t=0 forms a discrete-time Markov
chain with stationary transition probabilities. The transi-
tion probability P[(Xt+1, Yt+1) = (x′, y′) | (Xt, Yt) = (x, y)]
is given by
QCA,r(x, y;x
′, y′) =

rx
rx+ y
, if (x′, y′) = (x+ 1, y),
y
rx+ y
, if (x′, y′) = (x, y + 1),
0, otherwise.
(1)
Note that the transition probabilities are spatially inhomo-
geneous, i.e., they depend on the current state (x, y), which
makes the analysis difficult, especially when r > 1.
For the purpose of comparison, a RW competition model
incorporates skill and luck but not the CA effect (no exter-
nalities), where the transition probabilities are determined
entirely by the fitness ratio r. In particular, the probability
that agent X receives the unit of wealth introduced at any
time is always given by
pX =
fX
fX + fY
=
r
r + 1
.
Thus the RW competition model is a discrete-time Markov
chain with the same state space S as the CA competition
model, but with the following spatially homogeneous tran-
sition probabilities,
QRW,r(x, y;x
′, y′) =

r
r + 1
, if (x′, y′) = (x+ 1, y),
1
r + 1
, if (x′, y′) = (x, y + 1),
0, otherwise.
The spatial homogeneity of the transition probabilities leads
to a more tractable analysis. In fact, the difference process
{Xt−Yt} is a standard biased RW with parameter r/(r+1).
Thus the abundance of known results for RW [19] can be di-
rectly translated into results for RW competitions, including
duration and intensity as we have defined in Section 3.1.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we use CA= and RW=
to denote CA and RW competitions with identical fitness
(r = 1), respectively. We use CA6= and RW6= to denote CA
and RW competitions with distinct fitnesses (r > 1), respec-
tively. Before presenting our results, we point out here some
connections between the CA and RW models that are useful
in our analysis. In particular, in CA=, all paths connecting
two given states (x0, y0) and (x, y) have the same probabil-
ity. This is a nice property that CA= shares with RW, which
metric 〈Model〉 r = 1 r > 1
duration T :
P(x0,y0)〈Model〉,r[T ≥ t]
CA ∼ t−1/2 . t
−(r−1)x0
& t−(r−1)(x0− 1r )
RW 1 ≤
[
4r
(r+1)2
]t
intensity N :
P(x0,y0)〈Model〉,r[N ≥ n]
CA ∼ n−1 ≤
(
2
r+1
)n−1
RW 1
(
2
r+1
)n−1
Table 1: Tail distributions for duration and inten-
sity of competitions in both RW and CA models.
Multiplicative constants are omitted in all expres-
sions involving t and n. The RW statistics can be
found in most textbooks on the topic, e.g. [19, pp.
113,116].
enables us to leverage existing results on RW in our analysis
of CA=. Unfortunately, this property is lost in CA6=, where
we resort to the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation for upper
and lower bounds on the probabilities of interest. In the
limiting case where Xt and Yt are both large but compara-
ble to each other, the connection to RW is again partially
retained, a fact we also exploit in the analysis of CA6=.
4. RESULTS
In this section we present our theoretical results for du-
ration and intensity distributions, which are also illustrated
graphically and supported by extensive numerical simula-
tions. Table 1 provides a summary of our main results along
with prior knowledge about RW competitions from the liter-
ature. Note that P(x0,y0)〈Model〉,r denotes the probability in model
〈Model〉 ∈ {CA,RW} with fitness ratio r and initial state
(x0, y0). The following notations have been used in Table 1
and will be used throughout the rest of the paper.
• f(x) ∼ g(x) if and only if limx→∞ f(x)/g(x) = 1.
• f(x) . g(x) if and only if lim supx→∞ f(x)/g(x) ≤ 1.
• f(x) & g(x) if and only if lim infx→∞ f(x)/g(x) ≥ 1.
All proofs are relegated to Section 5.
4.1 Competition Duration
As shown in Table 1, a RW= competition never ends,
i.e., P(x0,y0)RW,1 [T = ∞] = 1, while the duration of a RW 6=
competition exhibits an exponential tail with a base that is
inversely proportional to the fitness ratio r, which means
that RW6= competitions are generally very short. The story
for CA competitions is drastically different. The introduc-
tion of CA guarantees that a competition always ends, i.e.
P(x0,y0)CA,r [T < ∞] = 1, even when the two agents are equally
fit, which is in sharp contrast with endless RW= competi-
tions. On the other hand, CA fundamentally increases du-
ration of competitions between unequally fit agents, which
always has a power-law distribution, in contrast with a sub-
exponential distribution for RW6=. Thus, cumulative ad-
vantage does not always make competitions shorter as one
might expect.
4.1.1 Equal Fitness Case: CA=
The following theorem shows that the duration T for CA=
is heavy-tailed with an asymptotic power-law distribution.
Theorem 1. The duration of a CA= competition has the
following asymptotic tail distribution,
P(x0,y0)CA,1 [T ≥ t] ∼
1
2x0+y0−5/2
√
piB(x0, y0)
t−1/2, (2)
where B(x, y) =
∫ 1
0
sx−1(1− s)y−1ds is the beta function.
It follows from (2) that
P(x0,y0)CA,1 [T <∞] = 1− limt→∞P
(x0,y0)
CA,1 [T ≥ t] = 1,
i.e. the duration of CA= is almost surely finite.
Note, however, that the power-law exponent is always
−1/2, independent of the initial wealth x0 and y0. Conse-
quently, although the duration of CA= is finite rather than
infinite as in RW=, the expected duration is still infinite,
even if x0 is significantly larger than y0 or vice versa.
On the other hand, the initial wealth (x0, y0) does affect
the location of the distribution. Figure 2 shows the dura-
tion distributions from simulations for various values of ini-
tial wealth, with the asymptotes in Eq. (2) superimposed.
Each simulation curve is the average of 105 independent runs
for 107 time steps each. Note the good agreement between
theory and simulation in the tails. When both x0 and y0
increase but are kept equal, the distribution curve shifts up-
wards, which means the competition lasts longer. When
the initial wealth of only one agent (y0 here) increases, the
distribution curve shifts downwards, which means the com-
petition is shorter.
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10−4
10−3
10−2
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100
Duration (t)
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T >
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]
 
 
x0 = 1, y0 = 1
x0 = 1, y0 = 5
x0 = 5, y0 = 5
x0 = 20, y0 = 20
Figure 2: Tail distribution for duration of CA= with
various (x0, y0). The dots are simulation results. The
solid lines are the asymptotes in Eq. (2).
4.1.2 Different Fitness Case: CA6=
The next theorem shows that the tail distribution of the
duration T for CA6= is asymptotically bounded by power
laws from both below and above.
Theorem 2. The tail distribution of the duration of a
CA6= competition has the following asymptotic bounds,
ϕ1 t
−(r−1)x0 . P(x0,y0)CA,r [T ≥ t] . ϕ2 t−(r−1)(x0−1/r), (3)
where
ϕ1 =
Γ(rx0 + y0)
(r + 1)x02x0+y0−1Γ(x0)Γ(y0)
, (4)
and
ϕ2 =
2(r−1)(x0−r
−1)Γ(r−1)Γ(rx0 + y0)
(r + 1)(x0 − r−1)Γ(x0)Γ(y0) , (5)
where Γ(x) =
∫∞
0
sx−1e−sds is the gamma function.
It follows from the lower bound that P(x0,y0)CA,r [T <∞] = 1
for r > 1, i.e. the duration for CA6= is almost surely finite as
is for CA=. The constants ϕ1 and ϕ2 turn out to be pretty
loose, so the bounds are best interpreted as bounds on the
tail exponent.
Note that the power-law exponents in the upper and lower
bounds depend on x0 but not on y0, and they differ only by
1 − 1/r < 1. In this sense, the shape of the distribution
at large t is largely determined by the fitness ratio and the
initial wealth of the fitter agent, while the initial wealth of
the less fit plays a much weaker role. This is illustrated in
Figure 3, which shows the duration distributions from sim-
ulations for r = 1.2 and various values of (x0, y0), alongside
the lower bounds from Eq. (3) that are shifted closer to the
simulation results for easier comparison of the slopes. Each
simulation curve is the average of 105 independent runs for
109 time steps each.
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Figure 3: Tail distribution for duration of CA6= with
r = 1.2 and various (x0, y0). The dots are simulation
results. The solid lines are the asymptotic lower
bound in Eq. (3) but shifted closer to the simulation
results for easier visual comparison of the slopes.
Figure 3(a) shows how the slopes of the distribution curves,
which correspond to the power-law exponents, depend crit-
ically on x0. The impact of x0 is two-fold. As x0 increases,
the distribution curve becomes more tilted as predicted by
the bounds. At the same time, it also shifts downwards.
Both changes mean that the competition tends to be shorter.
Figure 3(b) shows the impact of changing both x0 and
y0. When x0 is fixed, increasing y0 only results in a slight
decrease in the absolute value of the slope, in agreement
with Eq. (3). The distribution curve shifts upwards, which
means the competition tends to last longer. When both x0
and y0 increase, the situation becomes more intricate. The
curve may shift upwards while bending down faster in the
tail, which could possibly lead to a crossover in the old and
new curves, as is the case of going from (x0, y0) = (1, 1) to
(x0, y0) = (3, 3). In this case, the new competition is more
likely to have a medium long duration.
4.1.3 Struggle-of-the-Fittest Phenomenon
Now we look at the impact of fitness ratio r on duration.
Contrasting Eqs. (2) and (3) leads to an interesting observa-
tion. Departing from CA= by slightly increasing the fitness
ratio r from 1 to 1 + ε, where ε is close to 0, precipitates
a significant increase in the probability of long-lasting com-
petitions, as manifested in the discontinuous jump in the
power-law exponents from −1/2 in Eq. (2) to −εx0 ≈ 0 in
Eq. (3). This is opposite to what happens in RW competi-
tions, where a slight increase in fitness departing from RW=
to RW6= transforms the competition from one that never
ends to one with a geometrically distributed duration. The
lower bound in Eq. (3) shows that CA6= with r < 1+(2x0)−1
is more likely to have long-lasting competitions than CA=,
despite the fact that the fitter agent is bound to become the
ultimate winner. We call this phenomenon “struggle of the
fittest”.
Figure 4 shows the duration of simulated CA competitions
for various fitness ratios r. Each simulation curve is the
average of 105 independent runs for 109 time steps each.
Note how the distribution of duration jumps upward from
the curve for CA= to the curve for CA6= with r = 1.1. It also
shows how the curves for CA6= become more and more tilted
as r increases, being roughly parallel to the CA= curve at
r = 1 + (2x0)
−1 = 1.5.
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Figure 4: Tail distribution for duration of CA with
various r. The dots are simulation results. For r = 1,
the solid line is the asymptote in Eq. (2). For r > 1,
the solid lines are the lower bound in Eq. (3) but
shifted as in Figure 3.
4.2 Competition Intensity
Given that CA competitions are long-lasting, one might
expect them also to be intense, i.e., exhibit many ties (Xt =
Yt). As we will see in this section, this intuition is appropri-
ate only for CA= but not for CA6=.
4.2.1 Equal Fitness Case: CA=
The following theorem shows that the intensity N of CA=
is heavy-tailed with an asymptotic power-law distribution.
Theorem 3. The intensity of a CA= competition has the
following asymptotic tail distribution,
P(x0,y0)CA,1 [N ≥ n] ∼
1
2x0+y0−2B(x0, y0)
n−1, (6)
where B(x0, y0) is the beta function as in Eq. (2).
In this case, the intensity has infinite expectation, as does
the duration. Figure 5 shows the duration distributions
from simulations for various values of initial wealth, with
the asymptotes in Eq. (6) superimposed. Each simulation
curve is the average of 105 independent runs for 107 time
steps each. We observe the same behavior as in Figure 2.
When both x0 and y0 increase but are kept equal, the distri-
bution curve shifts upwards, which means the competition
is more intense. When the initial wealth of only one agent
(y0 here) increases, the distribution curve shifts downwards,
which means the competition is less intense.
We mention in passing that if we have a finite observation
time tf , the expected intensity Ntf by time tf grows as
log tf , a phenomenon observed for the related CA model in
Godre`che et al. [17].
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Figure 5: Tail distribution for intensity of CA= with
various (x0, y0). The dots are simulation results. The
solid lines are the asymptotes from Eq. (6).
4.2.2 Different Fitness Case: CA6=
In sharp contrast, CA6= competitions are not intense de-
spite their long duration. In fact their intensity is surpris-
ingly mild, bounded above by a geometric distribution, as
shown in the next theorem.
Theorem 4. The tail distribution of the intensity of a
CA6= competition has the following upper bound,
P(x0,y0)CA,r [N ≥ n] ≤ C
(
2
1 + r
)n−1
, (7)
with
C =
{
1, x0 ≤ y0,
(y0)x0−y0
(rx0+y0)x0−y0
(
1 + 1
r
)x0−y0 , x0 > y0,
where (x)k =
∏k−1
i=0 (x+ i) is the Pochhammer symbol.
Note that the expectation and all higher moments ofN are
finite. Therefore, the intensity of CA competitions changes
dramatically when the fitnesses of the two parties become
unequal, the distribution shifting from a power-law tail to an
exponential tail. This is illustrated in Figure 6, where each
simulation curve is the average of 105 independent runs for
109 time steps each. An important observation is that both
CA6= and RW6= competitions have intensities that are upper
bounded by identical exponential tails (see Table 1), while
exhibiting fundamentally different durations.
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Figure 6: Tail distribution for intensity of CA with
various r. The dots are simulation results. The solid
lines are the upper bounds from Eq. (7) for r > 1, and
the asymptote in Eq. (6) for r = 1.
Why are CA6= competitions simultaneously not intense
and long-lasting? The answer resides in the probability of
Y being the eventual winner. In CA= competitions, Y wins
with probability y0/(x0 + y0), while in CA6= competitions
Y (the less fit) never wins. However, for small values of
r, especially for those very close to one, the dynamics in
the initial stages of the competition closely follows that of
CA=. Thus there is a non-negligible chance that Y takes
a significant lead, with the CA effect helping it uphold the
lead for a long period of time over which there is no tie.
Eventually, however, fitness effect outweighs the CA effect,
and X catches up with Y . By then they both have large
accumulated wealth, which makes CA6= behave like RW6= in
the vicinity of X = Y , allowing X to quickly establish a
lead ahead of Y . At this final stage both fitness and CA
effects work in favor of X, and Y stands little chance in
taking the lead again. To summarize, the less fit agent has
a non-negligible probability of taking an early lead which
can last for a very long time due to the CA effect, but it
will ultimately surrender the lead to the fitter agent and
never lead again, a phenomenon that we call “delusion of the
weakest”, which is the flip-side of “struggle of the fittest”.
Figure 7 illustrates this observation by showing sample
paths for different values of r, all generated using the same
sequence of random bits. Note that for r = 1 (identical fit-
ness), Y wins quickly, whereas for r = 1.1 the fitter agent
X, having trailed behind for a long time, eventually takes
over after 69,426 time steps. Finally, for both r = 1.2 and
r = 1.5 agent X has no trouble quickly winning the com-
petition. These sample paths showcase the long struggle of
the “slightly” fitter agent in competitions with CA effects.
4.3 Interplay of Duration and Intensity
In this section, we study the relationship between dura-
t
X t
−
Y t
− 106
− 103
0
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106
2 10 102 103 104 105
r=1.00
r=1.10
r=1.15
r=1.20
r=1.50
Figure 7: “Delusion of the weakest”: sample paths
for different values of r (x0 = y0 = 1), all generated
using the same sequence of random bits
tion and intensity. Note that duration gives a natural upper
bound N ≤ T/2 for intensity, i.e., the number of ties is at
most half of the duration in any competition. In CA=, du-
ration and intensity are strongly and positively correlated.
In fact, a tie at time t increases the probability of having
another tie at a time later than t. More precisely, [2] shows
that for CA=,
P(x0,y0)CA,1 [T > t|Xt = Yt] ' 1−
1√
piXt
. (8)
Since Xt ∼ t/2 at a tie, Eq. (8) implies that the later a
tie occurs, the more likely another tie will occur, intuitively
explaining why long-lasting competitions are also intense in
this case.
Figure 8 shows a scatter-plot of duration versus intensity
from 104 independent runs of CA= competitions with x0 =
y0 = 1, each simulated for 10
9 time steps. This unveils a
strong positive correlation between the two statistics in log-
log scale (sample Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.94).
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Figure 8: Scatter plot of duration vs. intensity for
CA=.
Interestingly, CA6= shows a different behavior, since even
long-lasting competitions exhibit only a small number of
ties. Figure 9 shows simulation results for conditional av-
erage intensities of competitions with x0 = y0 = 1 and dif-
ferent fitness ratios r, conditioned on the duration being at
least t. Each simulation curve is obtained from 104 indepen-
dent runs for 109 time steps each. Note that for r = 1, the
conditional average intensity increases linearly with t, but
for r > 1, it stabilizes as t increases. Again, we observe a
sharp transition as we move from identical to distinct fit-
nesses, this time in the correlation between intensity and
duration.
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Figure 9: Conditional average intensity of competi-
tions conditioned on their duration being at least t,
namely E(x0,y0)CA,r [N | T ≥ t].
5. PROOFS
In this section, we provide proofs for our main results in
Section 4. We will use the following additional notations
and definitions.
• Denote the transition probability from state (x0, y0) to
state (x, y) in t = x+ y − x0 − y0 steps by
pr(x0, y0;x, y) = P(x0,y0)CA,r [(Xt, Yt) = (x, y)].
Note that the transition probability is nonzero only for
this specific t. Thus we will often omit to mention t
explicitly hereafter and assume that the appropriate t
has been chosen.
• Let τn be the time of the n-th tie, which can be defined
recursively by τ0 = −∞ and
τn = inf{t > τn−1 : Xt = Yt}, n ≥ 1.
Note that T = τN .
• Denote by qr(x0, y0) the probability of having no tie
after leaving state (x0, y0), i.e.,
qr(x0, y0) = P(x0,y0)CA,r [Xt 6= Yt, t ≥ 1].
Note that qr(x0, x0) = P(x0,x0)CA,r [τ2 =∞] and qr(x0, y0) =
P(x0,y0)CA,r [τ1 =∞] for x0 6= y0.
• Denote by An,t(x, y) the set of paths that start from
(x, y) at time 0 and end with the n-th tie at time t,
i.e., τn = t.
5.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Note that the CA= model is the standard Po´lya urn model.
The proof of Theorem 1 combines known results for this
model. Starting from the initial state (x0, y0), Xt has a
beta-binomial distribution with parameters x0 and y0 [22].
Note that the event Xt = Yt occurs only if t = |x0−y0|+2k
for some integer k ≥ 0. For such t, Xt = Yt if and only if
Xt = z0 + k, where z0 = max{x0, y0}. By Eq. (6.27) of [22],
P(x0,y0)CA,1 [Xt = Yt] = P
(x0,y0)
CA,1 [Xt = z0 + k]
=
B(z0 + k, z0 + k)
B(x0, y0)
(
t
k
)
. (9)
Recall that q1(x, y) is the probability of having no tie after
leaving state (x, y). Thus
P(x0,y0)CA,1 [T = t] = P
(x0,y0)
CA,1 [Xt = Yt] · q1(z0 + k, z0 + k), (10)
where the second factor on the right-hand side is the prob-
ability of having no tie after t.
Recall that the exit probability E(x, y) in [2] is the prob-
ability of ever having a tie starting from (x, y), including
the initial state (x, y). Thus for x 6= y, q1(x, y) is related to
E(x, y) by
q1(x, y) = 1− E(x, y).
Using Eq. (22) of [2] for E(x, y), we obtain
q1(x+ 1, x) = q1(x, x+ 1) =
Γ(x+ 1/2)
Γ(x+ 1)Γ(1/2)
.
However, q1(x, x) 6= E(x, x) = 1. By considering the one-
step transition from (x, x) to (x + 1, x) or (x, x + 1), we
obtain
q1(x, x) =
1
2
q1(x+ 1, x) +
1
2
q1(x, x+ 1) =
Γ(x+ 1/2)
Γ(x+ 1)Γ(1/2)
.
Eliminating Γ(x+ 1/2) by the identity
Γ(2x) = pi−1/222x−1Γ(x)Γ(x+ 1/2)
in [31, Eq. (5.5.5)], and using Γ(x+1) = xΓ(x) and Γ(1/2) =√
pi, we obtain
q1(x, x) =
Γ(2x)
x22x−1Γ(x)Γ(x)
=
1
x22x−1B(x, x)
. (11)
Substitution of Eqs. (9) and (11) into Eq. (10) yields
P(x0,y0)CA,1 [T = t] =
1
B(x0, y0)
· 1
(z0 + k)22k+2z0−1
(
t
k
)
.
For t = |x0 − y0|+ 2k, Stirling’s formula yields(
t
k
)
∼
√
2
pi
t−1/22t,
and hence
P(x0,y0)CA,1 [T = t] ∼
1
2x0+y0−5/2
√
piB(x0, y0)
t−3/2. (12)
It is well-known that as t → ∞, Xt/(Xt + Yt) converges
almost surely to a beta random variable V . It follows that
|Xt − Yt|/(Xt + Yt) → |2V − 1|. Thus, for V 6= 1/2, which
holds almost surely, we have |Xt − Yt|/(Xt + Yt) > 0 for all
large enough t. Therefore, P(x0,y0)CA,1 [T = ∞] = 0. Summing
over t in Eq. (12), we obtain as t→∞,
P(x0,y0)CA,1 [T ≥ t] =
∞∑
t′=t
P(x0,y0)CA,1 [T = t
′]
∼ 1
2
∞∑
s=t
1
2x0+y0−5/2
√
piB(x0, y0)
s−3/2
∼ 1
2
∫ ∞
t
1
2x0+y0−5/2
√
piB(x0, y0)
s−3/2ds
=
1
2x0+y0−5/2
√
piB(x0, y0)
t−1/2,
where we have used the fact that half of the terms are zero
in the second step, and
∑∞
s=t s
−a ∼ ∫∞
t
s−ads in the third
step. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
5.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Similar to Eq. (10), we have
P(x0,y0)CA,r [T = t] = pr(x0, y0; z0 + k, z0 + k) · qr(z0 + k, z0 + k).
(13)
Thus the proof here amounts to finding expressions for both
pr(x0, y0; z0 + k, z0 + k) and qr(z0 + k, z0 + k) in CA6=. We
break the proof into three lemmas.
Lemma 1.
pr(x0, y0;x0 + k, y0 + h) ≥ (x0)k(y0)h
(rx0 + y0)k+h
(
k + h
k
)
, (14)
for all k ≥ 0, h ≥ 0.
Lemma 2.
pr(x0, y0;x0 + k, y0 + h) ≤ (x0)k(y0)h
(r−1)k(rx0 + y0)h
, (15)
for all k ≥ 0, h ≥ 0.
Lemma 3. For r > 1,
qr(x, x)→ r − 1
r + 1
, (16)
as x→∞.
Before proving these lemmas, we first use them to prove
Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. By Lemma 1, we have
pr(x0, y0; z0 + k, z0 + k)
≥ (x0)k+z0−x0(y0)k+z0−y0
(rx0 + y0)2k+2z0−x0−y0
(
2k + 2z0 − x0 − y0
k + z0 − x0
)
=
Γ(rx0 + y0)
Γ(x0)Γ(y0)
× Γ(k + z0)Γ(k + z0)
Γ(k + z0 − x0 + 1)Γ(k + z0 − y0 + 1)
× Γ(2k + 2z0 − x0 − y0 + 1)
Γ(2k + 2z0 + (r − 1)x0)
Using the relation Γ(k + a)/Γ(k + b) ∼ ka−b as k →∞, we
obtain
pr(x0, y0; z0 + k, z0 + k) &
Γ(rx0 + y0)
2x0+y0−2Γ(x0)Γ(y0)
(2k)−(r−1)x0−1
= 2(r + 1)x0ϕ1(2k)
−(r−1)x0−1,
where ϕ1 is given by Eq. (4). Application of this asymptotic
bound and Lemma 3 to Eq. (13) yields
P(x0,y0)CA,r [T = t] & 2(r − 1)x0ϕ1t−(r−1)x0−1. (17)
Note that P(x0,y0)CA,r [T = +∞] = P(x0,y0)CA,r [N = +∞] = 0,
where the second equality will follow from Theorem 4, so
we will not provide a separate proof here. Summing over t
in Eq. (17) and noting that half of the terms are zero, we
obtain as t→∞,
P(x0,y0)CA,r [T ≥ t] =
∞∑
t′=t
P(x0,y0)CA,r [T = t
′]
&
∫ ∞
t
(r − 1)x0ϕ1s−(r−1)x0−1ds
= ϕ1t
−(r−1)x0 ,
establishing the lower bound.
In a similar way, Lemma 2 yields
pr(x0, y0; z0 + k, z0 + k)
. 2(r + 1)(x0 − r−1)ϕ2(2k)−(r−1)(x0−r
−1)−1,
where ϕ2 is given by Eq. (5). Application of this asymptotic
bound and Lemma 3 to Eq. (13) yields
P(x0,y0)CA,r [T = t] . 2(r − 1)(x0 − r−1)ϕ2t−(r−1)(x0−r
−1)−1,
and
P(x0,y0)CA,r [T ≥ t] =
∞∑
t′=t
P(x0,y0)CA,r [T = t
′] . ϕ2t−(r−1)(x0−r
−1),
establishing the upper bound.
Now we prove the lemmas. Recall that the transition
probability p(x0, y0;x, y) of going from (x0, y0) to (x, y) sat-
isfies the following recursion (Chapman-Kolmogorov equa-
tion),
pr(x0, y0;x, y) =
r(x− 1)
r(x− 1) + y pr(x0, y0;x− 1, y)
+
y − 1
rx+ y − 1pr(x0, y0;x, y − 1),
(18)
for x ≥ x0, y ≥ y0 and x + y ≥ x0 + y0 + 1, with the
boundary condition pr(x0, y0;x, y) = 0 for x < x0 or y < y0.
Note that we have replaced the one-step transition proba-
bilities QCA,r(x− 1, y;x, y) and QCA,r(x, y − 1;x, y) by the
expressions in Eq. (1).
Proof of Lemma 1. We will use the short-hand nota-
tion p(k, h) for pr(x0, y0;x0 + k, y0 + h), and ψ(k, h) for the
right-hand side of Eq. (14). We first prove the boundary
case for k = 0. By Eq. (18), for h ≥ 1,
p(0, h) =
y0 + h− 1
rx0 + y0 + h− 1p(0, h− 1),
which is a simple recursion in h and can be expanded to
yield
p(0, h) =
(y0)h
(rx0 + y0)h
p(0, 0) =
(y0)h
(rx0 + y0)h
= ψ(0, h),
which yields Eq. (14) for k = 0 and h ≥ 1. Here we have
used p(0, 0) = pr(x0, y0;x0, y0) = 1.
Similarly, for the other boundary case h = 0, k ≥ 1, we
have
p(k, 0) =
(x0)k
(x0 + r−1y0)k
p(0, 0) =
(x0)k
(x0 + r−1y0)k
≥ (x0)k
(rx0 + y0)k
= ψ(k, 0),
where the last inequality is because (x)k increases with x,
and x0 + r
−1y0 ≤ rx0 + y0.
For the general case, we use induction on k+h. The base
case k+h = 1 is already proven, since either k = 0 or h = 0
when k + h = 1. Assume Eq. (14) holds for k + h = m ≥ 1.
Consider k + h = m + 1. We can also assume k ≥ 1 and
h ≥ 1, since we have proven the boundary cases for k = 0
or h = 0. The recursion in Eq. (18) yields
p(k, h)
=
r(x0 + k − 1)
rk + h+ c0 − r p(k − 1, h) +
y0 + h− 1
rk + h+ c0 − 1p(k, h− 1)
≥ r(x0 + k − 1)
rk + h+ c0 − 1p(k − 1, h) +
y0 + h− 1
rk + h+ c0 − 1p(k, h− 1),
where c0 = rx0 + y0.
Applying the induction hypothesis p(k−1, h) ≥ ψ(k−1, h)
and p(k, h− 1) ≥ ψ(k, h− 1) to the above inequality yields
p(k, h)
≥ r(x0 + k − 1)
rk + h+ c0 − 1ψ(k − 1, h) +
y0 + h− 1
rk + h+ c0 − 1ψ(k, h− 1)
=
(rk + h)(k + h+ c0 − 1)
(k + h)(rk + h+ c0 − 1)ψ(k, h),
where in the last step we have used
ψ(k − 1, h) = k
k + h
· k + h+ c0 − 1
x0 + k − 1 ψ(k, h),
and
ψ(k, h− 1) = h
k + h
· k + h+ c0 − 1
y0 + h− 1 ψ(k, h).
To complete the proof, it suffices to show that
(rk + h)(k + h+ c0 − 1)
(k + h)(rk + h+ c0 − 1) ≥ 1,
but this is equivalent to r ≥ 1, which is true by assump-
tion.
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof of Lemma 2 follows the
same line of reasoning as that used to prove Lemma 1. The
boundary cases can be verified directly. We only outline the
induction step here. Applying Eq. (15) to the right-hand
side of Eq. (18) yields
p(k, h) ≤ r(x0 + k − 1)
rk + h+ c0 − r
(x0)k−1(y0)h
(r−1)k−1(c0)h
+
y0 + h− 1
rk + h+ c0 − 1
(x0)k(y0)h−1
(r−1)k(c0)h−1
=
[
r(r−1 + k − 1)
rk + h+ c0 − r +
c0 + h− 1
rk + h+ c0 − 1
]
(x0)k(y0)h
(r−1)k(c0)h
.
Note that
r(r−1 + k − 1)
rk + h+ c0 − r +
c0 + h− 1
rk + h+ c0 − 1
≤ r(r
−1 + k − 1)
rk + h+ c0 − r +
c0 + h− 1
rk + h+ c0 − r = 1,
which completes the induction.
Proof of Lemma 3. Recall that An,2k(x, x) is the set of
paths that start from (x, x) at time 0 and end with the n-th
tie at time 2k, i.e., τn = 2k. Let An,2k = An,2k(0, 0). Note
that the paths in An,2k(x, x) are exactly the paths in An,2k
translated by (x, x). Let p˜i ∈ An,2k and its state at time t be
p˜it = (x˜t, y˜t). The translation of p˜i by (x, x), denoted x+ p˜i,
is a path in An,2k(x, x), whose probability in the CA model
is given by
P(x,x)CA,r[x+ p˜i] =
2k−1∏
j=0
(
r(x+ x˜j)
r(x+ x˜j) + (x+ y˜j)
)x˜j+1−x˜j
×
2k−1∏
j=0
(
(x+ y˜j)
r(x+ x˜j) + (x+ y˜j)
)y˜j+1−y˜j
.
For fixed k and p˜i, as x→∞, P(x,x)CA,r[x+ p˜i] converges to
2k−1∏
j=0
(
r
r + 1
)x˜j+1−x˜j ( 1
r + 1
)y˜j+1−y˜j
= P(0,0)RW,r[p˜i],
which corresponds to the probability of the path p˜i in a ran-
dom walk with parameter r/(r + 1). Thus, as x→∞,
P(x,x)CA,r[τn = 2k] =
∑
p˜i∈An,2k
P(x,x)CA,r[x+ p˜i]
→
∑
p˜i∈An,2k
P(0,0)RW,r[p˜i] = P
(0,0)
RW,r[τn = 2k].
After summing over k and using the Dominated Convergence
Theorem, we obtain
P(x,x)CA,r[τn <∞] =
∞∑
k=1
P(x,x)CA,r[τn = 2k]
→
∞∑
k=1
P(0,0)RW,r[τn = 2k] = P
(0,0)
RW,r[τn <∞].
In particular,
qr(x, x) = 1−P(x,x)CA,r[τ2 <∞]→ 1−P(0,0)RW,r[τ2 <∞] =
r − 1
r + 1
,
where we have used Eq. (3.3) in [19] for P(0,0)RW,r[τ2 < ∞] in
the last step.
5.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Recall that An,t(x0, y0) is the set of paths starting from
(x0, y0) that end with the n-th tie at time t, i.e., τn = t. We
will use the short-hand notation An,t for An,t(x0, y0). As in
Section 5.1, the set An,t is non-empty only if t = |x0−y0|+2k
for some integer k ≥ n−1, in which case, every path in An,t
ends in state (z0 + k, z0 + k) with z0 = max{x0, y0}. Recall
from [2] that the probability of any path pi connecting states
(x0, y0) and (x, y) is
P(x0,y0)CA,1 [pi] =
B(x, y)
B(x0, y0)
=
B(x, y)
B(x0, y0)
2tP(x0,y0)RW,1 [pi].
Summing over pi ∈ An,t, where x = y = z0 + k, we obtain
P(x0,y0)CA,1 [τn = t] =
B(z0 + k, z0 + k)
B(x0, y0)
2tP(x0,y0)RW,1 [τn = t]. (19)
Thus the probability of having the n-th and also the last tie
at time t is given by
P(x0,y0)CA,1 [T = t,N = n]
= P(x0,y0)CA,1 [τn = t] · q1(z0 + k, z0 + k)
=
1
2x0+y0−2B(x0, y0)
· 1
t+ x0 + y0
P(x0,y0)RW,1 [τn = t] (20)
where we have used Eqs. (19) and (11) in the last step. Note
that P(x0,y0)RW,1 [τn = t] is the probability fn,t(d0) of the n-th
visit to the origin at time t in a simple symmetric random
walk starting from d0 = |x0 − y0|. Summing over t in (20),
we obtain
P(x0,y0)CA,1 [N = n]
=
1
2x0+y0−2B(x0, y0)
∞∑
k=n−1
1
2k + d0 + x0 + y0
fn,d0+2k(d0)
=
1
2x0+y0−2B(x0, y0)
Gn(1; d0), (21)
where
Gn(z; d0) =
∞∑
k=n−1
1
2k + d0 + x0 + y0
fn,d0+2k(d0)z
d0+2k.
To simplify Gn(z; d0), we have
d
dz
[zx0+y0Gn(z; d0)] = z
x0+y0−1
∞∑
k=n−1
fn,d0+2k(d0)z
d0+2k
= zx0+y0−1Φn(z; d0), (22)
where Φn(z; d0) =
∑∞
k=n−1 fn,d0+2k(d0)z
d0+2k is the gen-
erating function of the probability distribution of the n-th
visit to the origin in a simple random walk starting from d0.
Let F1(z) be the generating function of the distribution of
the time of the first return to the origin in a simple random
walk starting from the origin. The standard renewal argu-
ment (see e.g. XI.3.d of [15]) shows that Φn(z; d0) is given
by
Φn(z; d0) = [Φ1(z; 1)]
d0 [F1(z)]
n−1,
where Φ1(z; 1) and F1(z) are given by Eqs. (3.6) and (3.14)
of [15, Chap. XI], respectively. Therefore,
Φn(z; d0) = z
−d0
(
1−
√
1− z2
)n+d0−1
. (23)
Substituting Eq. (23) into Eq. (22) and integrating from 0
to 1 yields
Gn(1; d0) =
∫ 1
0
z2min{x0,y0}−1
(
1−
√
1− z2
)n+d0−1
dz,
where we have used x0 + y0 − d0 = 2 min{x0, y0}. A change
of variable u =
√
1− z2 yields
Gn(1; d0) =
∫ 1
0
u(1− u2)min{x0,y0}−1(1− u)n+d0−1du,
which is upper bounded by
Gn(1; d0) ≤
∫ 1
0
u(1− u)n+d0−1du = B(2, n+ d0), (24)
and lower bounded by
Gn(1; d0) ≥
∫ 1
0
u(1− u)min{x0,y0}−1(1− u)n+d0−1du
= B (2, n+ max{x0, y0} − 1) , (25)
where we have used min{x0, y0} + d0 = max{x0, y0}. Ap-
plying Eqs. (24) and (25) to Eq. (21) yields
B(2, n+ max{x0, y0} − 1)
2x0+y0−2B(x0, y0)
≤ P(x0,y0)CA,1 [N = n]
≤ B(2, n+ d0)
2x0+y0−2B(x0, y0)
.
Note that P(x0,y0)CA,1 [N = ∞] = P(x0,y0)CA,1 [T = ∞] = 0. Sum-
ming over n and using
∑∞
m=nB(2,m) = n
−1, we obtain
1
2x0+y0−2B(x0, y0)
· 1
n+ max{x0, y0} − 1
≤ P(x0,y0)CA,1 [N ≥ n] ≤
1
2x0+y0−2B(x0, y0)
· 1
n+ d0
,
which immediately yields Eq. (6).
5.4 Proof of Theorem 4
We first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4. The probability P(x0,y0)CA,r [τ1 < ∞] of ever hav-
ing a tie is bounded as follows,
P(x0,y0)CA,r [τ1 <∞] ≤
{
1, x0 ≤ y0,
(y0)x0−y0
(rx0+y0)x0−y0
(
1 + 1
r
)x0−y0 , x0 > y0.
Note that P(x0,y0)CA,r [τ1 <∞] is the exit probability E(x, y) in
[2] when r = 1.
Proof. The case x0 = y0 is trivial since τ1 = 0. When
x0 < y0, Theorem 3.21 of [20] yields Yt/Xt → 0 almost
surely, from which it follows that Xt > Yt eventually and
hence P(x0,y0)CA,r [τ1 <∞] = 1.
Now assume x0 > y0. Recall that A1,t(x0, y0) is the set of
paths starting from (x0, y0) that end with the first tie at time
t. Note that A1,t(x0, y0) is nonempty only if t = d0 + 2k,
where d0 = x0 − y0 and k ≥ 0. Let pi ∈ A1,t(x0, y0) and its
state at time j be pij = (xj , yj). The probability of the path
pi is given by
P(x0,y0)CA,r [pi] =
t−1∏
j=0
(
rxj
rxj + yj
)xj+1−xj ( yj
rxj + yj
)yj+1−yj
=
rxt−x0(x0)xt−x0(y0)yt−y0∏t−1
j=0(rxj + yj)
=
rxt−x0(x0)xt−x0(y0)yt−y0∏t−1
j=0[(r − 1)xj + x0 + y0 + j]
,
where in the last step we have used xj + yj = x0 + y0 + j.
Note that P(x0,y0)CA,r [pi] is maximized if the xj ’s are minimized,
subject to the constraints that the xj ’s increase monotoni-
cally from x0 to xt with step size 0 or 1, and that xj > yj
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ t − 1, or equivalently xj > x0 + (j − d0)/2.
This is achieved by the following sequence,
x∗j =

x0, j = 0, 1, . . . , d0 − 1;
x0 + b(j − d0)/2c+ 1, j = d0, d0 + 1, . . . , t− 1;
xt, j = t.
The corresponding path pi∗ has probability
P(x0,y0)CA,r [pi
∗]
=
d0−2∏
j=0
y0 + j
rx0 + y0 + j
(
xt−1∏
x=x0
rx
rx+ (x− 1) ·
x− 1
r(x+ 1) + (x− 1)
)
× xt − 1
rxt + (xt − 1) ,
which, after arrangement, yields,
P(x0,y0)CA,r [pi
∗]
=
d0−1∏
j=0
y0 + j
rx0 + y0 + j
(
xt−1∏
x=x0
rx
(r + 1)x+ r
· x
(r + 1)x+ (r − 1)
)
≤ (y0)d0
(rx0 + y0)d0
rxt−x0
(r + 1)2(xt−x0)
=
(y0)d0(r + 1)
d0
(rx0 + y0)d0
(
r
r + 1
)xt−x0 ( 1
r + 1
)yt−y0
=
(y0)d0(r + 1)
d0
(rx0 + y0)d0
P(x0,y0)RW,r [pi].
Thus we have
P(x0,y0)CA,r [pi] ≤ P(x0,y0)CA,r [pi∗] ≤
(y0)d0(r + 1)
d0
(rx0 + y0)d0
P(x0,y0)RW,r [pi],
and, after summing over pi ∈ A1,t(x0, y0),
P(x0,y0)CA,r [τ1 = t] ≤
(y0)d0(r + 1)
d0
(rx0 + y0)d0
P(x0,y0)RW,r [τ1 = t].
Summing over t, we obtain
P(x0,y0)CA,r [τ1 <∞] ≤
(y0)d0(r + 1)
d0
(rx0 + y0)d0
P(x0,y0)RW,r [τ1 <∞].
By Eq. (3.9) and XI.3.d of [15], P(x0,y0)RW,r [τ1 < ∞] = r−d0 ,
from which the desired conclusion follows.
Corollary 1. The probability of having at least one more
tie starting from a tie state (x, x) is bounded by
P(x,x)CA,r[τ2 <∞] ≤
2
r + 1
.
Proof. By considering the one-step transition from (x, x)
into (x, x+ 1) or (x+ 1, x), we obtain
P(x,x)CA,r[τ2 <∞]
=
r
r + 1
P(x+1,x)CA,r [τ1 <∞] +
1
r + 1
P(x,x+1)CA,r [τ1 <∞]
≤ x
(r + 1)x+ r
+
1
r + 1
≤ 2
r + 1
,
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 4.
Now we prove Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4. Let Zn be the common value of
Xt and Yt at t = τn, i.e., Zn = Xτn . Conditioned on τn <
∞ and Zn = z, the probability of τn+1 < ∞ is just the
probability of having a tie after leaving (z, z). Thus
P(x0,y0)CA,r [τn+1 <∞ | τn <∞, Zn = z] = P(z,z)CA,r[τ2 <∞] ≤
2
r + 1
,
by Corollary 1. Removal of the conditioning yields
P(x0,y0)CA,r [τn+1 <∞ | τn <∞] ≤
2
r + 1
.
It follows that
P(x0,y0)CA,r [N ≥ n] = P(x0,y0)CA,r [τn <∞]
= P(x0,y0)CA,r [τ1 <∞]
n−1∏
i=1
P(x0,y0)CA,r [τi+1 <∞ | τi <∞]
≤ P(x0,y0)CA,r [τ1 <∞]
(
2
r + 1
)n−1
.
An application of Lemma 4 completes the proof.
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
As supported by various empirical studies over the last
century, real world competitions for resource accumulation
seem to be subject to cumulative advantage effects, at least
to some degree. Because of such findings and the fact that
CA generally leads to large inequalities in resource distribu-
tion, understanding the role of skill and luck in competition
dynamics becomes a pressing issue both in theory and prac-
tice. Indeed, recent empirical [35, 37] and theoretical [11,
2, 24] studies have contributed in this direction. However,
contrary to prior theoretical works, we consider simple and
classical mathematical models that capture just the essence
of skill and luck competitions with and without CA effects,
and investigate fundamental aspects of competition, namely
duration (i.e., time until ultimate winner emerges) and in-
tensity (i.e., number of ties in competition). By considering
simple models and simple properties we prove and illustrate
fundamental theoretical results: CA effect exacerbates the
role of luck - power law tail duration emerges regardless of
skill differences, and become extreme (i.e., infinite mean)
when skill differences are small enough. Moreover, duration
is long not necessarily because of intense competition where
agents tussle aggressively for ultimate leadership. On the
contrary, under CA, competitions are generally very mild,
exhibiting an exponential tail. Long competitions emerge
when an early stroke of luck places the less skilled in the
lead, who can then, boosted by CA effects, enjoy leadership
for a very long period of time. Thus, when CA is present
luck sides with the less skilled.
The non-negligible probability of long-lasting competitions
has far-reaching implications. In the absence of CA, it takes
very little time for the fittest agent to establish dominance,
so it is often reasonable to neglect the possibility of a prema-
ture burnout. Such observations are in hand with the “sur-
vival of the fittest” principle, since soon enough the more
skilled will prevail. In the presence of CA, however, even
agents with large fitness superiority may face the challenge
of having to endure extremely long competitions. This chal-
lenge becomes all more real when the fitness superiority is
only minimal. Will the more skilled survive the seemingly
eternal inferiority during the competition? Under CA time
becomes a central issue, with delusion becoming reality if
the more skilled burns out during a long struggle. Thus,
in the face of CA, the fittest survives only if it can persist,
which prompts us to rename the principle “survival of the
fittest and persistent” when considering CA competitions.
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